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Abstract 
 
Issues of bonds increased in inter-war Japan, the main investors in bonds being banks 
because demand for loans declined in this period. Banks that were more tolerant of risks 
(that is, whose capital ratio was higher) made a larger amount of loans, which were riskier 
than bonds. While national bonds were traded actively in secondary markets, local bonds, 
corporate bonds, and bank debentures were not traded actively during this period. After 
the formation of cartels of banks and securities firms for bond underwriting and trading 
during the Great Depression, bond trading in secondary markets diminished, except for 
national bonds. 
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Bond Markets and Banks in Inter-war Japan 
 
Makoto Kasuya 
 
Introduction 
During and soon after the First World War, Japan experienced an economic boom and an 
increase in overall price levels. After the financial panic of 1920, however, prices plunged and 
the Japanese economy remained sluggish during the 1920s. Moreover, the Great Kanto 
Earthquake struck the Tokyo region and caused great suffering. Owing to these difficulties, 
banks ran up considerable debts and saw big runs on several occasions.1 The Showa 
Financial Crisis of 1927 was the largest of such runs, and forty-five banks closed.2 In addition 
to these general economic circumstances, some institutional factors in the banking industry 
are thought to have contributed to the problems. Firstly, it was common practice in inter-war 
Japan for directors of industrial firms to assume directorships of banks, and the resultant 
symbiotic relationships led to banks extending large loans to related industrial firms, many of 
which were not repaid.3 Secondly, since because of a significant increase in deposits during 
the First World War, capital ratio to total assets declined, leading to severe agency problems 
in banking. And thirdly, although banks had become dependent on short-term deposits, their 
lending became more long term, because the sluggish economic conditions meant that loans 
to agriculture became a fixture, while those to industrial firms could not readily be recovered. 
In this way, Japanese banks faced an increased maturity mismatch.4 
 
The main source of external funds for large non-financial firms at this time was the issue of 
stocks. Bank loans were usually short-term (about 60 to 90 days) and often rolled over; they 
were a source of industrial firms’ working funds. The debt owed to the banks by large firms 
was in most cases less than their share capital. Corporate bond issues, however, increased 
rapidly after 1924 and became the main source of external funds for large firms in the late 
1920s, before declining in the 1930s. The reasons for the dominance of bond issues were as 
follows. Firstly, because of plunging stock prices in 1920 and the sluggish recovery in the 
following decade, firms found it difficult to issue new shares. Secondly, the electric power and 
railway industries needed considerable long-term funding to develop significantly following the 
War, much of the investment towards which was raised on bond markets by corporations in 
those industries. Moreover, while the Commercial Code allowed companies to issue bonds up 
to the amount of their paid-up capital, a 1927 revision of the Electric Power Companies Law 
  
permitted companies in the electric power industry to issue bonds up to twice their paid-up 
capital. The amount of corporate bonds issued between 1925 and 1935 was thus almost as 
large as that of national bonds, and twice as large as that of either local bonds or bank 
debentures. However, due to increasing hostilities with China in 1936, the trend of corporate 
bonds was reversed, and a surge in national bond issues saw the amount of national bonds 
become several times larger than the amounts of each of the other three kinds of bonds.5 
 
Most banks held only a small amount of stock and, regarding stocks as risky, rarely 
underwrote them. Instead of purchasing stocks, financial institutions such as banks, trust 
companies, and insurance companies purchased more than half of the bonds issued in the 
inter-war period. As a result of bond purchases, the securities held by ordinary banks 
increased from 15 per cent of their total assets in 1925 to 27 per cent in 1936. Many banks 
accumulated huge amounts of bad debt, but the more successful institutions survived the 
crisis by investing in bonds.6 The trend of heavy investment in bonds is a trait common to all 
inter-war banking, although the same motives may be not be shared by each operator. For 
example, in the United Kingdom, when faced with declining demand for advances after 1932, 
the banks increased their bond holdings (especially government bonds).7 The same 
investment could also be seen in the United States, where banks faced massive bank runs; 
they sought to increase their investments in both cash reserves and government bonds.8 
 
As large amounts of bonds were issued, bond transactions in secondary markets naturally 
increased. National bonds had been listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) since its 
establishment in 1878, but the transaction volume had been minor except between 1878 and 
1884. In order to promote bond transactions, in 1920 the government separated national bond 
brokers from the general brokers who mainly engaged in stock futures transactions, resulting 
in bond trading increasing on the TSE. Margin buying and selling of national bonds began on 
the TSE in 1925. Local bonds, bank debentures, and corporate bonds were listed only on the 
cash market, and the amounts involved in their transactions were much smaller than those for 
national bonds. In the 1930s transactions in the four kinds of bonds, especially those of 
national bonds, increased rapidly on the TSE. The amount of bonds traded over the counter 
by securities firms is assumed to have been several times greater than that of bonds traded 
on the TSE, even in the 1930s, although the amount of over-the-counter transactions is 
unclear.9 
 
  
This paper aims to shed light on banks’ bond holding and trading in inter-war Japan. In the 
section that follows, I analyse why banks, which were principal investors in bonds, bought 
bonds instead of making loans. I then examine how banks dealt in bonds, and primarily 
whether or not they tended to buy and hold newly issued bonds until their redemption dates. If 
they did buy new issues and hold them until redemption, we must conclude that secondary 
markets for bonds were thin and bonds were highly illiquid assets for banks. If, on the other 
hand, banks did not usually buy newly issued bonds and hold them until their redemption, it 
means that secondary markets were thick, bonds liquid, and that banks adapted their 
portfolios to financial market conditions for higher yields or lower risk. I then go on to examine 
whether there was a change in banks’ bond trading during the inter-war period, before 
summarizing the above considerations and identifying the factors affecting banks’ bond 
trading. 
 
Banks’ Motives for Holding Bonds 
The amount of deposits in ordinary banks in Japan increased slightly after 1925 and peaked 
at 9.3 billion yen in 1928. In 1931, during the Great Depression, this figure declined to 8.3 
billion yen, after which it increased. The amount of loans by ordinary banks declined between 
1926 and 1934 (from ¥9.2bn in 1926 to ¥6.3bn in 1934), but aside from a slight decrease 
between 1929 and 1931 the amount of securities they held increased greatly in this period 
(¥2.2bn in 1926 and ¥3.9bn in 1934). In 1925 one-half of securities held by ordinary banks 
were national bonds, one-quarter were bank debentures and corporate bonds, one-fifth were 
stocks, and one-tenth were local bonds (Figure 1). The amount of bank debentures and 
corporate bonds owned by ordinary banks increased significantly between 1925 and 1928, 
and that of national bonds decreased between 1929 and 1931. Therefore, the ratio of bank 
debentures and corporate bonds to the total amount of securities increased until 1931. After 
1932, however, the amount of national bonds increased rapidly. On the other hand the ratio of 
local bonds was stable, while the ratio of stocks continued to decline during the same period. 
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Figure 1  
Securities held by ordinary banks 
 
Sources: Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, YBBMF (Tokyo, 1927-1939). 
 
What factors affected banks’ investment in securities? On the basis of earlier literature the 
following factors are assumed to have influenced banks’ investments: 
• Demand for loans was low, therefore banks bought bonds.  
• In order to cope with bank runs banks invested in bonds, which could be sold or 
used as collateral for a loan.  
• Securities companies distributed bonds (especially corporate bonds) to financial 
institutions. 
In order to shed light on factors affecting the amount and composition of bonds held by banks, 
two regressions have been run. 
 
Although no statistics are available showing the amounts of national bonds, local bonds, bank 
debentures, and corporate bonds held by each bank separately, the amounts of paid-up 
capital, reserves, and deposits of each bank are available in Ōkurashō Ginkōkyoku Nenpō 
(Yearbook of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, hereafter YBBMF). The amounts 
  
of paid-up capital, reserves, and deposits of ordinary banks were summed up by prefecture. 
Moreover, YBBMF also provides figures for the total amount of national bonds, total amount of 
local bonds, and total amount of bank debentures and corporate bonds held by ordinary banks 
in each prefecture,10 the average rate of six-month term deposits, and the average rate of 
advances on promissory notes (the normal form of loan) in each prefecture. Regression 
analyses are done on the basis of figures by prefecture for the years 1928, 1932, and 1936.11 
 
Firstly, bond ratio (BR, the ratio of the total amount of national bonds, local bonds, bank 
debentures, and corporate bonds in each prefecture to the sum of amounts of paid-up capital, 
reserves, and deposits in each prefecture) is regressed on spread in each prefecture 
(SPREAD, the average rate of advances on promissory notes minus the average rate of six-
month time deposits in each prefecture), and capital ratio (CAPRAT, the ratio of total amount 
of paid-up capital and reserves to the total amount of paid-up capital, reserves, and deposits 
in each prefecture). Regression is done with OLS (ordinary least squares). SPREAD is an 
explanatory variable to indicate motives for bond holdings for high yields. Because banks can 
be expected to make more loans if spread is wider, the sign of the coefficient of SPREAD is 
expected to be minus. CAPRAT is an explanatory variable to indicate a bank’s risk tolerance. 
Since the higher a bank’s capital ratio is, the more tolerant to risks the bank is, a bank whose 
capital ratio is higher is expected to make more loans, the risks of which are higher than that 
of buying bonds. Therefore, the sign of the coefficient of CAPRAT is expected to be minus. In 
addition to these two variables, year dummy variables for the years 1932 and 1936 are added 
into the estimation. The result of the estimation is as follows (figures in parentheses are t-
values and ** denotes significance at the 1 per cent level, while * denotes significance at the 5 
per cent level): 
 
BR=0.35 – 4.79SPREAD – 0.20CAPRAT + 0.02Dum1932 + 0.09Dum1936, 
  (11.38)** (-5.11)**     (-2.48)*        (1.47)          (5.09)** 
N=138, adj. R2=0.39, F=23.18. 
 
The signs of the coefficients of SPREAD and CATRAT are both minus as expected. 
The second regression is run on the following equations: 
RNB=a1+b1SECHOUSE+b2TERMDEP+b3LBDEP+b4Dum1932+b5Dum1936, 
RLB=a2+b6LBDEP+b7Dum1932+b8Dum1936, 
RBDCB=a3+b9SECHOUSE+b10TERMDEP+b11Dum1932+b12Dum1936. 
  
RNB indicates the ratio of national bonds, RLB the ratio of local bonds, and RBDCB the ratio 
of the sum of bank debentures and corporate bonds, respectively, in each prefecture to the 
total amount of national bonds, local bonds, bank debentures, and corporate bonds in each 
prefecture. SECHOUSE is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if one or more offices of the 
three major securities firms (Nomura Securities Co., Yamaichi Securities Co., and Nikko 
Securities Co.) existed in each prefecture, and otherwise equals 0. LBDEP indicates the ratio 
of the outstanding amount of local bonds issued by a prefecture and cities and towns in the 
prefecture and publicly subscribed or underwritten by nongovernmental institutions, to the 
amount of deposits of ordinary banks in the prefecture. As large amounts of local bonds were 
directly bought and held by the Deposit Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (DBMF), these 
bonds are excluded from the outstanding amount. TERMDEP denotes the ratio of term 
deposits to total deposits of ordinary banks in each prefecture. Year dummy variables of 1932 
and 1936 are also added. 
 
Because these equations are share equations (RNB+RLB+RBDCB=1), estimation is done 
with SUR (seemingly unrelated regressions) and the sum of the coefficients of the same 
variables equals zero. SECHOUSE indicates the effects of transaction costs on bank bond 
holdings. For securities, which were more easily bought through institutions other than 
securities houses, the coefficient of SECHOUSE is expected to be minus. LBDEP is added to 
verify whether banks tended to hold bonds issued by local bodies where they were located, 
and the sign of its coefficient is expected to be plus. TERMDEP is an explanatory variable that 
indicates motives for holding bonds with an eye to deposit payments, and the sign of its 
coefficient is expected to be minus if a category of bonds (for example, national bonds) is held 
as reserves for payments of deposits.  
 
  
Table 1  
Factors affecting selection of bonds held by banks 
 
  RNB RLB RBDCB 
Intercept 0.75  0.07  0.18  
 (11.09)** (6.27)** (2.69)** 
SECHOUSE -0.07   0.07  
 (-2.30)*  (2.29)* 
TERMDEP -0.25   0.25  
 (-2.23)*  (2.23)* 
LBDEP -0.24  0.24   
 (-6.37)** (6.44)**  
DUM1932 -0.06  -0.02  0.09  
 (-1.92) (-1.33) (2.74)** 
DUM1936 0.08  -0.02  -0.06  
 (2.33)* (-1.35) (-1.83) 
Adj. R2 0.15  0.22  0.15  
 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values; ** denotes significance at 1 per cent level, * at 5 
per cent level. 
 
Sources: Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, YBBMF (Tokyo, 1929, 1933, and 1937). 
 
The result of the second estimation is shown in Table 1. The coefficient of SECHOUSE is 
significant and positive for RBDCB and negative for RNB. This result implies that bank 
purchasing of bank debentures and corporate bonds was heavily dependent on the activities 
of securities companies, while banks were able to purchase national bonds more easily 
through various intermediate institutions. The coefficient of TERMDEP is significant and 
negative for RNB and positive for RDBCB. This result implies that national bonds were held by 
banks as means of reserves for outstanding claims and that bank debentures and corporate 
bonds were better loan substitutes for banks than national bonds. The coefficient of LBDEP is 
  
significant and positive for RLB and negative for RNB, thus confirming statistically that banks 
tended to hold bonds issued by local public bodies in their neighbourhood. 
 The two regression analyses confirm that: 
1) Banks invested more in bonds in relation to loans 
2) Banks held national bonds as reserve assets for payments of deposits 
3) Banks tended to hold local bonds in the neighbourhood 
4) Securities companies played an important role in distribution of bank debentures and 
corporate bonds. 
 
Banks’ Bond Trading 
This section analyses how banks dealt in bonds and whether trading practices changed during 
the period under consideration. As a large number of bond transactions occurred outside 
exchanges, any analysis must explore individual banks’ bond transactions, both within and 
outside exchanges. However, since no detailed records or materials exist showing individual 
banks’ long term bond purchases or sales, I have used lists of securities holdings from semi-
annual bank reports to shareholders – these show issues, face values, and book values of 
bonds held by a bank at the end of an accounting period (June 30 or December 31) – in order 
to explore banks’ bond trading. Bank purchases and sales of bonds have been calculated on 
the basis of the following assumptions: 
 
Firstly, that the net increase or decrease of an issue of bonds held by a bank between the end 
of year t and the end of year t-1 was a gross increase or decrease during year t. This 
assumption appears reasonable as the amount of bond issues for the banks examined 
changed relatively infrequently. Secondly, that an increase in the amount of bonds in the year 
of issue amounted to an acquisition of bonds in primary markets. I regard an increase in the 
amount of bonds after the year of issue as an acquisition of bonds in secondary markets. In 
the same way, I regard a decrease in the amount of bonds in the redemption year as 
indicating redemption of the bonds, and a decrease in an the amount of bonds before the year 
of the issue’s redemption as a sale of bonds. However, I regard a small decrease of a bond 
issue as redemption if the bonds were actually redeemed, by drawing or by purchase, in that 
year. Finally, I regard as unknown any increase or decrease of bonds for which the issue 
remains unidentified due to incomplete description. 
 
My examination begins with the year 1926 because corporate bond issues increased in the 
middle of the 1920s, and it concludes with 1935 because 5-per cent national bonds were 
  
rolled over into 3.5-per cent bonds in 1936, causing a significant rise in redemptions of 
national bonds. In addition, financial market controls commenced in 1937 as a result of 
hostilities with China. The focus is on bond trading at four banks (Mitsubishi Bank, Aichi Bank, 
Hyakujū Bank, Akita Bank) during this period for three reasons. Firstly, listings of the 
securities of these four banks are available; this is unusual, because ordinary banks were not 
required to list securities in their semi-annual reports. Secondly, these banks held large 
numbers of bonds. I assume that banks holding large numbers of bonds also held numerous 
bond issues. These banks, accordingly, are adequate for this analysis, as I would expect 
increases and decreases in bonds to be recorded for multiple years. Thirdly, the number of 
mergers and acquisitions carried out by these banks is small. If a bank merged with (or 
acquired the operations of) another bank, we would be unable to identify the increase of an 
issue of bonds in the merger year as an increase by purchase in (primary or secondary) 
markets because the merger itself may have caused the increase. I regard such an increase 
as ‘unknown’, except for issues of bonds in the year of the merger (which I regard as obtained 
in primary markets). Consequently, banks that conducted few mergers and acquisitions are 
preferred for the purpose of this study. The selected four banks meet the latter two conditions, 
as shown in Table 2. Aichi Bank was located in central Japan, Hyakujū Bank in western 
Japan, and Akita Bank in northern Japan; thus these banks, often called regional banks, 
represent a geographical spread of Japanese banks. 
 
  
Table 2 
Data on the selected four banks (1928) 
 
Bank 
 
 
Head office in Deposits Securities 
  
Merger with 
and/or 
acquisition 
of another 
bank in  
Place in 
order of 
deposits 
of all the 
ordinary 
banks 
 
Place in 
order of 
securities 
of all the 
ordinary 
banks 
   (\000)  (\000)  
Mitsubishi Tokyo 1929 555,080 5th 322,894  2nd 
Aichi Nagoya, Aichi 1928 176,593 9th 85,126  7th 
Hyakuju Shimonoseki, 
Yamaguchi 
1928 41,512 33rd 28,531  16th 
Akita Akita, Akita 1928, 1931 18,014 75th 6,031 71st 
 
Note: Mergers and acquisitions between 1926 and 1935 are listed. Acquisitions of operations 
of a branch are not listed because securities, normally held in the head office, are 
assumed not to have been received from an acquired branch. 
 
Source: Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, YBBMF (Tokyo, 1930). 
 
Before considering each individual bank’s bond trading, I should explain bond underwriting 
and distribution practices.12 
a) National bonds were underwritten by large banks from 1911 on, and these banks 
distributed the bonds themselves and through other banks and securities firms. Securities 
firms sometimes sub-underwrote the bonds. In 1932, however, the Bank of Japan began to 
purchase national bonds directly from the government and sell them to banks and other 
financial institutions. 
b) Local bonds issued by Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya – Japan’s three largest cities – were 
usually underwritten by large banks in the respective cities. Local bonds issued by other cities 
and prefectures were normally bought by the Deposits Bureau of the Ministry of Finance or 
underwritten by trust companies and/or securities firms, though some were sold directly to 
investors. Local bonds underwritten by large banks were distributed by their underwriters 
and/or securities firms. The other local bonds, except for those bought by the DBMF, were 
distributed by their underwriters. In 1931 five major securities firms (Yamaichi Securities Co., 
Koike Securities Co., Nikkō Securities Co., Nomura Securities Co., and Fujimoto Bill Broker 
Bank, which was to be renamed Fujimoto Securities Co. in 1933) formed a cartel called 
Rokusankai to restrict severe competition in the underwriting and distribution of local bonds. 
  
c) Bank debentures were issued by special banks that were allowed to issue bonds by their 
acts. Bank debentures were directly sold to investors or underwritten and distributed by trust 
companies and/or securities firms.  
d) First-class corporate bonds were underwritten by large banks and large trust companies, 
which distributed them themselves and/or through securities firms. Second-class corporate 
bonds were underwritten and distributed by securities firms, with some also being sold directly 
to investors.13 In the 1920s large banks often were the sole underwriters of corporate bonds. 
In 1933 large banks, trust companies, and insurance companies in Tokyo reached an 
agreement on bond issuance. They declared that they would give preference to, and 
exclusively underwrite, secured bonds issued by firms that had established sinking funds. 
After this agreement, large banks and trust companies typically formed a syndicate to 
underwrite each separate issuance of corporate bonds, while the five large securities firms, 
which had formed a cartel for local bonds, now jointly sub-underwrote corporate bonds. Banks 
and other financial institutions participated in the issuance of bonds and worked more co-
operatively after the Great Depression than in the 1920s. Mitsubishi Bank underwrote the third 
largest amount of corporate bonds (\786m) between 1920 and 1939, with the Industrial Bank 
of Japan first (\1,469m) and Mitsui Bank second (\1,285m).14 On the other hand, the three 
regional banks underwrote few bonds: the amount of corporate bonds underwritten by Aichi 
Bank in the same period was ¥77m, Hyakujū Bank’s was ¥2m, and Akita Bank’s was ¥1m. 
Consequently, Mitsubishi Bank’s role as an underwriter will be considered as well as its role 
as an investor. 
 
Let us begin with Mitsubishi Bank. In 1929 it acquired the business of Morimura Bank, which 
had deposits and securities at the time of purchase worth ¥29m and ¥9m in cash respectively, 
and it opened four offices in Tokyo.15 Its deposits had increased rapidly in 1927 as money 
withdrawn from medium- or small-sized banks during the Showa Financial Crisis flowed into 
the Bank.16 Loans, however, did not increase as much as deposits. On the other hand, the 
amount of securities increased faster than that of loans and exceeded the latter in 1927. 
Figure 2 shows the amount of securities held by the Bank; the ratio of bank debentures and 
corporate bonds to total securities holdings was high, as compared with the average 
composition of securities held by ordinary banks shown in Figure 1, while the same ratio for 
national bonds was low except for 1936. 
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Figure 2  
Securities held by Mitsubishi Bank 
 
Sources: Mitsubishi Bank, Semi-annual Reports (Tokyo, 1925-1936). 
 
  
Table 3 
Mitsubishi Bank's bond trading (\000) 
 
 1926-1929 1930-1932 1933-1935
National bonds    
PSM 90,070 8,440 63,790 
PPM 74,666 2,507 73,002 
Unknown 
(increase) 2,661 0 0 
Redemption 2,574 3,060 0 
Sale 102,790 66,501 26,019 
Local bonds underwritten by Mitsubishi Bank  
PSM 2,050 0 2,350 
PPM 32,951 0 33,171 
Redemption 2,213 1,115 15,604 
Sale 15,192 9,201 135 
Local bonds not underwritten by Mitsubishi Bank 
PSM 2,800 0 2,000 
PPM 17,601 0 26,327 
Unknown 
(increase) 2,864 0 0 
Redemption 1,117 1,757 20,812 
Sale 20,173 0 0 
Bank debentures 
PSM 2,190 3,203 1,000 
PPM 97,977 15,450 63,300 
Unknown 
(increase) 9,425 0 0 
Redemption 23,005 14,281 85,330 
Sale 37,545 7,349 0 
Corporate bonds underwritten by Mitsubishi Bank 
PSM 1,354 5,494 200 
PPM 66,581 2,900 68,952 
Unknown 
(increase) 3,700 0 0 
Redemption 10,805 415 40,616 
Sale 12,976 17,204 110 
Corporate bonds not underwritten by Mitsubishi Bank 
PSM 9,820 2,700 2,132 
PPM 60,950 1,804 32,270 
Unknown 
(increase) 15,050 0 0 
Redemption 25,770 6,652 46,783 
Sale 17,000 2,963 3,155 
Unknown 
(decrease) 4,300 0 0 
Note: PSM denotes purchases in secondary markets and PPM denotes purchases in primary 
markets. 
 
Sources: Mitsubishi Bank, Semi-annual Reports (Tokyo, 1925-1935); Industrial Bank of 
Japan, List of Bonds (Tokyo, 1925-1936). 
  
 
Table 3 shows Mitsubishi Bank’s bond trading. While most of the other types of bonds were 
purchased in primary markets, approximately half the national bonds were purchased in 
secondary markets. During the period under consideration most national bonds were sold 
before their redemption. Although most of the local bonds underwritten by Mitsubishi Bank 
were sold before 1932, very few of them were sold after 1933. Similarly, over 90 per cent of 
the local bonds not underwritten by this bank were sold in the 1920s, but none were sold after 
1930. Cessation of sales of underwritten local bonds occurred later than that of local bonds 
not underwritten by Mitsubishi Bank. All the local bonds sold were issued in the 1920s except 
for bonds of ¥135,000, which were issued in 1934 and sold in 1935. In other words, Mitsubishi 
Bank sold almost no local bonds issued in the 1930s. It sold a total of ¥35m in local bonds 
between 1926 and 1929, of which 41 per cent (¥14m) were sold in the year after the year of 
issue, and 44 per cent (¥16m) were sold in the second year after issue. When it did sell, 
Mitsubishi primarily sold local bonds within one or two years of issue. Although it underwrote 
many local bonds, it underwrote few bank debentures. It sold approximately 60 per cent of its 
bank debentures in the 1920s, one-third between 1930 and 1932, and none between 1933 
and 1935. This trend resembles that for local bonds not underwritten by Mitsubishi Bank. 
Moreover, no bank debentures issued in the 1930s were sold in the same way as local bonds. 
Of the ¥37.5m of bank debentures sold between 1926 and 1929, 89 per cent (¥33m) were 
sold in the year following issue. Sales trends for corporate bonds underwritten by Mitsubishi 
Bank resemble those for local bonds underwritten by it. Sales trends for corporate bonds not 
underwritten by Mitsubishi also resemble those for local bonds not underwritten by it, although 
redeemed corporate bonds exceeded sold corporate bonds in the 1920s. Although Mitsubishi 
sold ¥23m in corporate bonds in the 1930s, it sold no corporate bonds issued after 1931. It 
sold a total of ¥30m of corporate bonds between 1926 and 1929, 82 per cent of which it sold 
(¥24m) in the year following issue. As with local bonds and bank debentures, when it did sell 
corporate bonds, it did so soon after their issue. 
 
Secondary markets for national bonds were very wide and those for other kinds of bonds were 
not. Local bonds, bank debentures, and corporate bonds, however, were widely sold in the 
second half of the 1920s, especially in the year following issue. In contrast, very few of these 
three kinds of bonds issued in the 1930s were sold. Out of  31 issues of local bonds, 37 
issues of bank debentures, and 51 issues of corporate bonds, all issued between 1930 and 
1934 and held by Mitsubishi Bank: only 12 issues of local bonds, 8 of bank debentures, and 4 
of corporate bonds were redeemed in the year after that of issue. Thus, Mitsubishi Bank held 
  
numerous bond issues between 1933 and 1935 that it could have sold, but did not. The facts 
examined here suggest that market conditions for these three kinds of bonds changed 
significantly after the Great Depression.  
 
Next let us examine Aichi Bank, most of whose offices were in Aichi Prefecture. In 1928 it 
acquired the operations of Fukada Bank in Tokyo, which held deposits and securities worth 
¥2m and ¥1m in cash, respectively, and opened two branches in Tokyo.17 Although they not 
increasing as rapidly in 1927 as those of Mitsubishi Bank, Aichi Bank’s deposits increased 
steadily until June 1929. The amount of securities it held increased with the increase in 
deposits, while the amount of loans peaked in June 1926. During the Great Depression 
deposits decreased, and in the first half of 1932 they declined sharply with a run on banks in 
and around Nagoya (the amount of deposits peaked at ¥180m in June 1929 and bottomed at 
¥114m in June 1932). After this bank run, Aichi Bank’s deposits increased steadily once again 
and surpassed the 1929 peak in the first half of 1938. The amount of loans continued to 
decline after the bank run and began to increase in the second half of 1935. Compared with 
the average composition of securities of ordinary banks, Aichi Bank held few stocks but many 
local bonds, bank debentures, and corporate bonds in 1925 (Figure 3). Because the amount 
of national bonds increased significantly in 1927 and 1928, the ratio of national bonds to the 
total amount of securities increased as well. During the Great Depression and the bank run, 
the bank’s holdings of national bonds and local bonds decreased. When deposits increased 
after 1933, only the amount of national bonds increased, while that of local bonds remained 
small. The amount of bank debentures and corporate bonds increased between 1925 and 
1927 and then levelled off. 
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Figure 3  
Securities held by Aichi Bank 
 
Sources: Aichi Bank, Semi-annual Reports (Nagoya, 1925-1936). 
 
  
Table 4 
Aichi Bank's bond trading (\000) 
 
 1926-1929 1930-1932 1933-1935
National bonds 
PSM 32,015 7,300 33,790 
PPM 17,639 15,577 0 
Unknown (increase) 13,097 0 0 
Redemption 36,189 27,867 2,220 
Sale 8,840 19,612 6,023 
Local bonds 
PSM 4,681 1,790 245 
PPM 12,115 8,980 3,759 
Unknown (increase) 4,814 150 0 
Redemption 13,388 1,299 12,899 
Sale 4,902 7,779 100 
Unknown (decrease) 2,275 0 150 
Bank debentures 
PSM 2,330 1,390 500 
PPM 2,300 4,380 4,750 
Redemption 3,242 5,365 5,240 
Sale 700 1,495 500 
Unknown (decrease) 7 0 0 
Corporate bonds 
PSM 14,280 2,979 2,400 
PPM 27,038 9,605 23,380 
Unknown (increase) 1,000 0 250 
Redemption 28,319 1,965 19,467 
Sale 4,628 8,850 2,270 
Unknown (decrease) 0 1,000 250 
 
Note: As Table 3. 
Sources: Aichi Bank, Semi-annual Reports (Nagoya, 1925-1935); Industrial Bank of Japan, 
List of Bonds (Tokyo, 1925-1936). 
 
  
National bonds were mainly purchased in secondary markets between 1926 and 1929 and 
between 1933 and 1935, and mainly purchased in primary markets during the Depression 
(Table 4); local bonds were purchased in primary markets throughout the period under 
consideration. So its purchases of these two kinds of bonds followed almost the same pattern 
as Mitsubishi Bank’s. One-half of its bank debentures and one-third of its corporate bonds 
were purchased in secondary markets in the second half of the 1920s, while in the 1930s 
most were purchased in primary markets. The percentage of its purchases of corporate bonds 
in secondary markets in the 1920s is much higher than that of Mitsubishi Bank. All four kinds 
of bonds were generally held until their redemption dates with the exception of a large number 
of sales of national bonds and local bonds during the Depression (especially in the year of the 
bank run) and a high percentage of sales of national bonds after 1933. Although Aichi Bank 
increased its holdings of national bonds after the bank run, it sold them during the same 
period. The dominance of sales over redemptions of national bonds between 1933 and 1935 
parallels the case of Mitsubishi Bank. 
 
The third bank we look at is Hyakujū Bank, which operated mostly in Yamaguchi Prefecture. 
Hyakujū Bank experienced a business crisis in 1913 and received capital subscriptions from 
Mitsubishi Bank and Yamaguchi Bank in Osaka. Mitsubishi Bank took a one-third stake in 
Hyakujū Bank and dispatched senior executives to it. It is not known, however, how Mitsubishi 
Bank participated in the bank’s management. For example, of 302 issues of bonds that 
Hyakujū Bank owned between 1926 and 1936, 105 were owned by Aichi Bank and 85 by 
Mitsubishi Bank. I assume, therefore, that Hyakujū Bank selected issues of bonds at its own 
discretion. In 1928 it merged with two small banks in Yamaguchi. One was Bōchō Bank, which 
had deposits and securities at the end of 1927 worth ¥4m and ¥2m respectively. The other 
was Hagi Bank, with deposits and securities at the same time worth ¥2m and ¥1m 
respectively. It also acquired the operations of the Shimonoseki Branch of Mitsui Bank and 
received its deposits of ¥4m.18 
 
If increases by mergers and acquisitions are excluded, Hyakujū Bank’s deposits did not 
increase much until 1933, though it did not see tremendous withdrawals of money during the 
Great Depression. Deposits increased gradually from 1934 on. After declining in 1926 and 
1927 the amount of loans levelled off until 1933, at which point they began to increase. Over 
the same time period, the amount of securities increased until 1928 and levelled off until 1932, 
after which it began to increase until levelling off again in 1935. Thus, the amount of loans was 
smaller than that of securities from 1927 on. Over one-half of the securities possessed by this 
  
bank were bank debentures and corporate bonds, and the ratio of national bonds to the total 
amount of securities was less than one-fourth (Figure 4). This composition is very different 
from the average composition of ordinary banks. In some of Hyakujū Bank’s semi-annual 
reports in the second half of the 1920s, management states that the bank could not find 
customers to lend money to and had no other option than to purchase bonds. These 
statements support the findings of our first section. 
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Figure 4  
Securities held by Hyakuju Bank 
 
Sources: Hyakuju Bank, Semi-annual Reports (Shimonoseki, 1925-1936). 
 
  
Table 5 
Hyakujū Bank's bond trading (\000) 
 1926-1929 1930-1932 1933-1935
National bonds  
PSM 324  97 1,000 
PPM 2,381  318 0 
Unknown (increase) 221  0 0 
Redemption 2,310  57 510 
Sale 0  1,031 251 
Unknown (decrease) 1  15 0 
Local bonds  
PSM 150  0 3,988 
PPM 5,201  140 4,324 
Unknown (increase) 563  300 0 
Redemption 4,408  708 6,541 
Sale 92  272 345 
Unknown (decrease) 55  459 294 
Bank debentures  
PSM 500  780 250 
PPM 9,430  4,735 4,420 
Unknown (increase) 19  0 0 
Redemption 3,574  5,083 11,595 
Sale 0  0 0 
Unknown (decrease) 1  1 2 
Corporate bonds  
PSM 2,107  2,220 4,308 
PPM 11,459  2,266 21,830 
Unknown (increase) 0  0 500 
Redemption 7,982  796 17,887 
Sale 380  0 0 
Unknown (decrease) 37  0 500 
 
Note: As Table 3. 
Sources: Hyakujū Bank, Semi-annual Reports (Shimonoseki, 1925-1935); Industrial Bank of 
Japan, List of Bonds (Tokyo, 1925-1936). 
 
  
Hyakujū Bank’s bond trading was different from Aichi Bank’s in two respects (Table 5). Firstly, 
it sold only \251,000 worth of national bonds between 1933 and 1935, whereas Aichi Bank 
sold a large amount of national bonds. Secondly, it acquired local bonds, bank debentures, 
and corporate bonds mainly in primary markets even in the 1920s, whereas Aichi Bank 
purchased in both primary and secondary markets. Having said that, there are similarities 
between the operations of the two banks: they both bought national bonds in secondary 
markets between 1933 and 1935, and then held bonds other than national bonds until 
redemption. They invested in newly issued bonds and continued to own them until their 
redemption dates, except for a high ratio of national bond sales between 1930 and 1932. 
 
Lastly, we look at Akita Bank, most of whose offices were in Akita Prefecture. In 1928 it 
merged with Senhoku Bank, which had deposits and securities at the end of 1927 worth ¥2m 
and ¥0.2m respectively, and acquired the operations of Ikeda Bank, with deposits and 
securities at the same time of only ¥0.3m and ¥0.02m respectively. In 1931 it acquired the 
deposits and loans of Noshiro Bank, with deposits at the end of 1930 worth ¥1m.19 After the 
merger and acquisition in 1928 the amount of this bank’s deposits increased quickly. In 1931 
many banks in Akita Prefecture saw mass bank withdrawals, but the run did not spread to 
Akita Bank. Its deposits stagnated during the Great Depression, but increased steadily from 
1932. During the period from 1929 to 1934 the amount of loans declined, levelled off in 
1935,20 and began to increase in 1936. In contrast, a reduction in 1932 aside, the amount of 
securities increased until 1935. As a result, the amount of securities exceeded that of loans in 
1933. Akita Bank stated in several of its semi-annual reports that it had surplus funds and 
invested them in bonds. In 1925 more than 80 per cent of securities possessed by this bank 
were national bonds (Figure 5), but this number continued to decline as the amount of bank 
debentures and corporate bonds increased, so that by 1932 three quarters of the securities it 
held were bank debentures and corporate bonds—a composition similar to that of Hyakuju 
Bank. After 1933 the ratio of national bonds increased and reached 38 per cent in 1936, which 
is lower than the average ratio of ordinary banks. Akita Bank possessed few local bonds and 
stocks. 
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Figure 5  
Securities held by Akita Bank 
 
Sources: Akita Bank, Semi-annual Reports (Akita, 1925-1936). 
 
 
 
  
Table 6 
Akita Bank’s bond trading (\000) 
 
 1926-29 1930-32 1933-35
National bonds  
PSM 544  15 500 
PPM 1,135  32 3,000 
Unknown (increase) 176  0 0 
Redemption 1,296  109 85 
Sale 1,545  1,179 451 
Local bonds  
PSM 0  0 0 
PPM 180  0 5 
Unknown (increase) 77  0 0 
Redemption 445  141 66 
Sale 40  75 0 
Unknown (decrease) 0  0 77 
Bank debentures  
PSM 700  0 0 
PPM 480  260 550 
Unknown (increase) 17  0 0 
Redemption 90  77 1,377 
Sale 0  0 0 
Corporate bonds  
PSM 610  2,435 2,950 
PPM 1,115  542 9,775 
Unknown (increase) 1,400  0 0 
Redemption 242  1,517 9,070 
Sale 280  0 0 
 
Note: As Table 3. 
Sources: Akita Bank, Semi-annual Reports (Akita, 1925-1935); Industrial Bank of Japan, List 
of Bonds (Tokyo, 1925-1936). 
 
Like Hyakujū Bank, Akita Bank bought national bonds through the primary market in the 
1920s and also bought few national bonds during the Great Depression (Table 6). Although 
  
Aichi Bank and Hyakujū Bank bought them through secondary markets after 1933, Akita Bank 
continued to buy them through primary markets. It bought bank debentures and corporate 
bonds through secondary markets as well as primary markets in the 1920s, and its ratio of 
such purchases in secondary markets, like Aichi Bank’s, declined from 1933, whereas 
Hyakujū Bank’s increased slightly. The ratio of sold national bonds to redeemed national 
bonds is higher than for the other three kinds of bonds (as with Aichi Bank and Hyakujū Bank), 
but Akita’s ratio of sold national bonds in the 1920s is the highest of the three regional banks. 
It tended to retain its local bonds, bank debentures, and corporate bonds until redemption, 
though in the 1920s it sold more corporate bonds than it redeemed. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The main investors in corporate bonds in the inter-war period were financial institutions, and in 
prefectures where demand for money was lower banks bought more bonds, as is evident in 
the cases of Hyakujū Bank and Akita Bank. In the 1920s large banks like Mitsubishi Bank and 
Aichi Bank purchased national bonds in secondary markets, but after the Great Depression 
medium-sized banks like Hyakujū Bank came to utilise secondary markets for buying national 
bonds. In the 1920s only Mitsubishi Bank sold national bonds on a large scale. Akita Bank 
sold more national bonds than it redeemed in the 1920s, as did Aichi Bank after the Great 
Depression. The period 1930-1932 was a stage of transition in the purchasing and selling of 
national bonds. The three regional banks were distant from Tokyo, so presumably they dealt 
in national bonds outside the TSE, with over-the-counter transactions developing throughout 
Japan. Mitsubishi Bank sold large amounts of local bonds, bank debentures, and corporate 
bonds in the 1920s, but very few in the 1930s. Although the three regional banks purchased 
these three kinds of bonds mainly in primary markets, Aichi Bank and Akita Bank bought them 
in secondary markets more actively in the 1920s than after the Great Depression. The three 
regional banks sold few bonds other than national bonds during the period under 
consideration, and over-the-counter transactions of these three kinds of bonds probably did 
not develop in the 1930s.  
 
There are three factors affecting both the inactivity of secondary markets for these three kinds 
of bonds in comparison with national bonds, and the 1933 - 35 decrease in the purchasing of 
these three kinds of bonds by investors like Aichi Bank and Akita Bank from underwriters like 
Mitsubishi Bank. Firstly, the credibility of these bonds depends upon the issuer, while maturity, 
coupon rates, and redemption dates vary from issue to issue. Thus when an investor intends 
to sell them before the redemption date it is harder to find buyers for an issue of these bonds 
  
than it may be with national bonds. Hence, trading of these kinds of bonds is generally less 
active than that of national bonds (and even in the case of national bonds a few benchmark 
bonds are traded actively but the others are not). Secondly, issues of re-funding bonds 
increased, and such re-funding bonds sold well in the middle of the 1930s. Moreover, many 
holders of redeemed bonds were able to apply for newly issued bonds in exchange for 
redeemed ones. Thus, compared with the second half of the 1920s, after the Great 
Depression underwriters like Mitsubishi Bank could sell them more easily in the year of issue 
(and were not compelled to sell bonds in the year following issue). Finally, after the agreement 
in 1933, the banks formed syndicates to underwrite corporate bonds after the agreement in 
1933, a significant departure from the 1920s; after the formation of Rokusankai in 1931, 
securities firms also formed underwriting syndicates for local bonds and sub-underwriting 
syndicates for corporate bonds, and the practice became more widespread than in the 
preceding decade.21 As bonds came to be underwritten and distributed co-operatively, 
underwriters were left holding few underwritten bonds other than what they had decided to 
add to their portfolio in advance. 
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Notes 
1  For more on Japanese banking, see Goldsmith, The Financial Development of Japan; 
Tamaki, Japanese Banking; Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Financing and Governance in 
Japan. 
 
2  Yabushita and Inoue, “The Stability of the Japanese Banking System.” 
 
3  Kato, Honpō ginkō-shi ron; Okazaki, Sawada, and Yokoyama, “Measuring the Extent and 
Implications of Director Interlocking.” 
 
4  Teranishi, Evolution of the Economic System in Japan, 136-142. 
 
5  Shimura, Nihon shihon shijō bunseki, 279-334; Shimura, ed., Nihon kōshasai shijō shi, 37-
79. 
 
6  Asajima, “Ryōtaisenkan ni okeru chihō ginkō no yūkashōken shoyū”; Ishii and Sugiyama, 
eds., Kin’yū kiki to chihō ginkō. 
 
7  Ross, “Bank Advances and Industrial Production”; Capie and Collins, Have the Banks 
Failed British Industry?, 44-59. 
 
8  Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 449-462; Calomiris and 
Wilson, “Bank Capital and Portfolio Management.” Calomiris and Wilson emphasize that 
banks decreased loans in order to reduce depositor risk as banks’ capital issuance costs 
increased during the Great Depression. 
 
9  Shimura, ed., Nihon kōshasai shijō-shi, 74-75. 
 
10  The amounts of national bonds, local bonds, and bank debentures and corporate bonds of 
a branch in Prefecture A of Bank X, whose head office existed in Prefecture B, were in 
YBBMF included in the amounts of national bonds, local bonds, bank debentures, and 
corporate bonds, respectively, of Prefecture A. In contrast, the amounts of paid-up capital, 
reserves, and deposits were summed up by banks in YBBMF and summed up by prefectures 
by the author. Thus, the basis of summation of figures for paid-up capital, reserves, and 
deposits is different from that for the four kinds of bonds. But since a bank normally held 
securities at its head office, the gap between the two summation bases does not cause 
serious problems for our analysis. 
 
11 Because Okinawa is far removed from the other prefectures, it is excluded from the 
regressions. 
 
12  Kasuya, “Securities Markets and a Securities Company.” 
 
13  For the underwriting capabilities of banks and securities companies, see Konishi, “Bond 
Underwriting by Banks”; idem, “Bond Underwriting Syndicates.” 
 
14  Kikkawa, “Senkanki no shasai hakkō to nanadai kin’yū keitō.” 
 
15  Mitsubishi Ginkō-shi Hensan Iinkai, Mitsubishi Ginkō-shi, 196-214. 
 
16  Okazaki, “Showa Kin’yū Kyōko to Mitsubishi Ginkō.” 
 
  
17  Osawa, Aichi Ginkō yonjūrokunen-shi, 217-265. 
18  Yamaguchi Ginkō, Yamaguchi Ginkō-shi, 344-407. 
 
19  Akita Ginkō, Akita Ginkō hachijunen-shi, 377-397. 
 
20 Akita Bank, like other banks that had suffered as a result of large amounts of long-term 
loans secured by property, requested the government-related Japan Hypothec Bank to take 
over its debts, which the latter did. For loans secured by property, see Nanjo, “Developments 
in Land Prices and Bank Lending in Interwar Japan.” 
 
21  Yamaichi Shōken, Yamaichi Shōken-shi, 725. 
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